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What makes a screening program ethical?
Abstract
Ethics, as a discipline, asks "is this decision, situation, program or policy good? Under what
circumstances is it good? Why?". This paper applies these questions to screening: "Is screening good?
Under what circumstances is it good? Why is it good?". Of course, the answer to these questions depends
on how one defines "good". A consequentialist, for instance, will suggest that a screening program is
good when it prevents or, at least, reduces harm and suffering1 whereas non-consequentialists are likely
to take a rather different approach. In this short paper, I have room only to skate across the surface of
these arguments. I will suggest that there are at least two, rather different, sets of responses to the
questions above and I will investigate the detail of two of these. The first response states that screening
programs are good when they prevent harm and suffering; the second suggests that screening programs
are worthwhile because they enhance autonomous decision making.
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WHAT MAKES A SCREENING
PROGRAM ETHICAL?

SENSITIVITY, SPECIFICITY AND
ALL THAT SCREENING JARGON

Annette Braunack-Mayer
Associate Professor
Discipline of Public Health
University of Adelaide

Adrian Heard
Epidemiologist
South Australian Department of Health
Sensitivity and specificity are the measures of a
screening test against the “true” results. In other
words population screening, which generally
uses relatively simple tests so that they can be
conveniently used by a large number of people, can
only ever provide an incomplete version of the true
results.

Introduction
Ethics, as a discipline, asks “is this decision, situation,
program or policy good? Under what circumstances is
it good? Why?”. This paper applies these questions to
screening: “Is screening good? Under what circumstances
is it good? Why is it good?”. Of course, the answer to
these questions depends on how one defines “good”. A
consequentialist, for instance, will suggest that a screening
program is good when it prevents or, at least, reduces harm
and suffering1 whereas non-consequentialists are likely to
take a rather different approach. In this short paper, I have
room only to skate across the surface of these arguments. I
will suggest that there are at least two, rather different, sets
of responses to the questions above and I will investigate the
detail of two of these. The first response states that screening
programs are good when they prevent harm and suffering;
the second suggests that screening programs are worthwhile
because they enhance autonomous decision making.

In population screening there are four groups which
result from the screening process; two groups
which benefit from the test and two which receive
unhelpful information. There are those people
who are correctly identified as having the disease
after being screened. They are well served by the
screening process and receive important health
information (the truly diseased group). Those who are
correctly identified as not having the disease, have
their faith in their own good health supported (the
truly healthy group). The other two groups are not as
well served by the screening process. They are those
who return a positive screening test but do not have
the disease (the false alarm group) and those who
return a negative test but do have the disease (the
missed group).

Screening to prevent harm and suffering
There is a wide range of guidance available to help determine
if a screening program is likely to be able to prevent harm
and suffering. Such guidance includes Wilson and Jungner’s
10 principles for mass screening programs (see Table 1),
which are still cited today when population screening
programs are proposed and evaluated.2 The principles
provide a set of straightforward guidelines for screening. The
principles are grounded in assessments of the importance
of the health problem and the availability and acceptability
of screening tools and treatment for the health problem. The
principles are also grounded in the scientific understanding
of the condition and a favourable economic balance between
the costs and benefits of screening.

How well a screening test identifies the truly
diseased group, while keeping the false alarm group
as small as possible is called the positive predictive
value of the screening test, and is broadly regarded
as a measure of the efficiency of testing.
However, while a screening test may be efficient
in terms of resources, it will fail if it does not have
adequate sensitivity and specificity. Sensitivity
measures the size of the truly diseased group relative
to the sum of the truly diseased and missed groups.
A test which misses a lot of people will thus have
poor sensitivity and will be avoided in screening
programs. Specificity measures the size of the truly
healthy group relative to the sum of the truly healthy
and false alarm groups. Once again, a test which
gives many people false alarms will be rejected as a
screening test.

Each of these principles invites questions, and it is here
that the task of ethically evaluating a screening program
really begins. For example, Wilson and Jungner state that
the condition must be an important health problem, judged
on the basis of prevalence and seriousness. Candidates for
screening programs are more important if their conditions
are either prevalent, serious, or both. For example, diabetes,
particularly of a mild degree, is an example of a highly
prevalent condition; phenylketonia (PKU), on the other hand,
is extremely uncommon, but has very serious consequences
if not treated early in life; whilst cervical cancer is an
example of a condition that is both prevalent and serious.2
Judgements about seriousness and prevalence are not
simple objective measures; they are grounded in specific
social, political and cultural contexts. Thus, decisions about
which diseases to screen for reflect beliefs about whose



problems matter most; screening newborns is deemed
important, in part, because our society places the utmost
importance on the health of newborns and children.

populations, will have false positive rates of the order
of 10%. The impact of learning that one has a sexually
transmitted, life-long, incurable condition, particularly if
one has no symptoms, is likely to be profound. An ethical
assessment of a screening program needs to build an
awareness of these types of outcomes into any analysis.
6

Table 1: Principles of Early Disease Detection
1. The condition sought should be an important health problem.
2. There should be an accepted treatment for patients with
recognized disease.

Principle 3, in table 1, emphasises the point that screening
must only occur if people found to have a condition are able
to access the treatment they then need. How ”available”
does treatment need to be for it to be ethically acceptable?
Lippman, for example, notes that PKU testing is supported
across the United States, in part because there is a well
established and accepted diet for children diagnosed with
PKU.7 However, in only four states are health insurers
required to cover the costs of the special foods that children
with PKU need. Closer to home, one might argue that
screening for diabetic retinopathy amongst indigenous
people is only worthwhile if we are prepared to provide the
culturally accessible and appropriate services that will be
needed to make a difference to those with the condition.

3. Facilities for diagnosis and treatment should be available.
4. There should be a recognizable latent or early
symptomatic stage.
5. There should be a suitable test or examination.
6. The test should be acceptable to the population.
7. The natural history of the condition, including
development from latent to declared disease, should be
adequately understood.
8. There should be an agreed policy on whom to treat as
patients.
9. The cost of case finding (including diagnosis and
treatment of patients diagnosed) should be economically
balanced in relation to possible expenditure on medical
care as a whole.

One could go on, examining each of the principles and
identifying and analysing the extent to which population
benefits result from screening. As noted in the introduction,
the underpinning ethical theory in this approach is
consequentialist in orientation. However, some scholars
writing about the ethics of screening have noted that there
is a second set of arguments about the ethical acceptability
of screening programs, which is not based on a preventive
principle. These arguments focus instead on information
and autonomy, suggesting that screening can be regarded
as “good” because it enhances people’s capacity to make
their own decisions about their own lives, and that this is a
worthwhile aim in itself.8

10. Case-finding should be a continuing process and not a
“once and for all” project.
Source: Wilson J, Jungner G. Principles and Practice of
Screening for Disease. Geneva. World Health Organization. 1968.
Principle 2, in table 1, directs our attention toward the
outcomes of screening. The basic principle is that screening
is only desirable when a better prognosis is given by
identifying a condition, or its precursors, earlier. Clearly,
screening for conditions for which there is no treatment
available at all is hard to justify ethically. Usually, however,
the problem facing the public health practitioner is more
complex, as the evidence that screening “makes a
difference” is not always available or may be difficult to
collect. It is accepted practice that we ought not screen
in the absence of evidence of effectiveness.3 However,
if a screening program has become accepted practice in
the absence of adequate evidence of its effectiveness, it
would be difficult to discontinue such screening for this
reason alone. For example, clinical examination of the hips
of newborn infants is routinely performed as a screening
test for developmental dysplasia of the hip, despite little
firm evidence to support its value.4 However, as a Scottish
health technology assessment report noted: “this screening
has become such an accepted part of newborn health care
that it would be almost impossible to discontinue it without
compelling contradictory evidence”.5

Screening to promote individual autonomy
“Autonomy arguments” for screening are not grounded in
the classic public health principle of benefit for the health of
populations. Rather, they reflect an individualistic orientation
by suggesting that, quite outside their role in preventing or
reducing disease, screening programs can offer individuals the
opportunity to take more control over their lives. Screening
tests provide information, and information is a worthwhile aim
in itself, regardless of the outcome. Stone and Stewart go
so far as to suggest that this “information” aim represents a
“paradigm shift in the philosophy of screening”.8
Views such as these are typically found in debate about
the ethical acceptability of prenatal screening.7 Prenatal
screening is presented as an option that increases women’s
reproductive choices and control. Much has been written
about this issue and I will raise only three points. First,
the information women have available to them when they
make choices about reproduction is socially, historically and
culturally determined. Only some conditions can be tested
for; indeed, Lippman suggests, rather provocatively, that
women have had little control over which conditions warrant
screening tests at all. Instead, this has been determined
by the geneticists who provide the tests, something, she

Ethical analysis of the issues raised by principle 2 will also go
beyond debate about the scientific evidence for screening
and the need to consider other intended outcomes of
screening. Screening tests give rise to false positives and
negatives, and such events carry with them the potential for
considerable anxiety and distress. For example, screening
tests for herpes simplex virus 2, even in high prevalence



THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL
ISSUES AROUND EQUITY IN
HEALTHCARE: APPLICATION TO
CERVICAL CANCER SCREENING IN
SOUTH AUSTRALIA

posits, that reflects “almost exclusively a white, middle
class, perspective”.7
Second, the options available to women once they have test
results are, in reality, quite limited. Their capacity to control
their circumstances may be restricted to a simple decision
about whether to continue with a pregnancy or not. One
can imagine ways in which we might expand the available
choices, for example, by ensuring that whatever diseases
or conditions a child is born with will be treatable and/or
manageable by available resources.7
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Finally, even if we accept that there is a demand for
information, particularly in the burgeoning realm of screening
for genetic conditions, how much people actually understand
about the conditions for which they may be screened is
unclear. How well are people able to interpret information
about genetic status, particularly if that information includes
complex statements about risk and susceptibility to disease? If
we are contemplating mass screening for genetic conditions,
we need also to factor in the possibility that those who
provide information about screening may not be competent to
explain the nature of screening to their patients, or to answer
questions before and after test results are available.8
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Conclusion
The principles that guide screening have been well described
for almost 40 years. For most of this period, ethical debate
about the interpretation of these principles has focused
on the extent to which screening programs can prevent
or reduce the burden of disease. More recently, some
screening programs, particularly in prenatal and genetic
testing, have been justified in terms of their capacity to
enhance personal autonomy. This paper has suggested that
neither the preventive nor the autonomy enhancing rationale
can be taken at face value. In both cases, arguments about
whether a screening program is, indeed, “good” will need
to be made on a case by case basis, with careful attention to
the circumstances and context of the individual program.

Introduction
Across the world, terms like “inequalities”, “disparities” and
“inequities” are often used interchangeably in academic and
policy literatures.1 Even when they are defined, there seems
little consensus about their meaning or measurement.2,3
The rationale for this paper is to distinguish “inequity”
from both “inequality” and “disparity” and to go on to
highlight how we might measure and monitor the equity
of healthcare provided to groups or populations. The paper
is divided into two main sections. The first section focuses
on the definition, measurement and monitoring of the
equity of healthcare. The second section uses actual data
on cervical screening rates in South Australia to highlight
issues around the inequitable uptake of preventive services.
Throughout both sections of the paper, we outline some of
the suggested reasons for inequitable healthcare services
and suggestions for future research.
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